The word “limited” is going to have to do a lot of work in the weeks ahead.
Israel has described its initial ground incursion into southern Lebanon as such, although its key ally, the Biden administration, has already suggested that what may initially begin as small in scope could risk dragging on.
It will take a remarkable amount of efficiency and discipline from the Israeli military and Israeli Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu to know when it is time to stop. Militaries are not particularly keen on pulling back, especially in large scale operations. If the incursion is easygoing, it could incentivize the Israel Defense Forces (IDF) to push forward, sensing a weakened enemy against which swift progress can be made. If the going gets tough, the IDF can suggest the mission is more imperative than ever, and that they must push on.
But, quite remarkably after two weeks of technological wizardry and ruthless, calculated attacks against Hezbollah – starting with the simultaneous explosion of communication devices and culminating in the killing of the militant group’s leader Hassan Nasrallah – the playing field may shift. The Israeli military are now walking into the ground trap that their adversary has been setting for them for well over a decade.
They may discover that Hezbollah, its leadership decapitated, is so enfeebled that it is genuinely a less challenging task than imagined to mop up what remains of its ground troops after months of heavy airstrikes. But southern Lebanon was always going to be where the Iran-backed group held the home advantage. Its tunnel network provides them an endless maze for Israeli forces. And so, knowing when to stop is going to be key to this not becoming a quagmire for Israel. Almost every modern war that has dragged on for years began with the idea that it would all be over in a matter of weeks.
While Israel’s operations over the past three weeks have been brutal, they have shown discipline and superior intelligence. But we’re now entering a new phase of this conflict in which key decisions must be made by an Israeli prime minister who was has shown himself to be maximalist in his military steps, and who is also desperately in need of a prolonged conflict to maintain his grip on power. It is going to take some extraordinarily swift dismantling of Hezbollah by the IDF for Netanyahu to be able to pull his forces out in a matter of days, and avoid months of not quite being sure how this all ends.
Does Israel’s Lebanon operation increase the chances of wider war with Iran? The US warned Tuesday of a possible retaliatory ballistic missile strike by Iran on Israel, but that does not translate in to guaranteed damage, given the April interceptions of dozens of similar rockets, and Iran has clearly shown that – so far – it does not have the resources nor the willingness to lead a wider regional response against Israel.
But this is also an increased hazard for the civilians of Lebanon and some form of enduring peace, or at least sustainable calm, in the region. The less likely a wider conflagration is, the less leverage the US and Europe have over the Netanyahu administration. Time and again the West has managed to pull the region back from a brink they have said is perilously close. But now all the red lines to Israel’s north have literally seen troops march over them, and it really is not clear if Iran has any viable means of intervention at this time, outside of missile attacks that it has tried before to little avail.
Yet the arc of retaliation is long, and Iran may exact retribution in ways not imminent yet still horrifically destabilizing – such as its very advanced nuclear program. But immediately they don’t seem to be able to deter Israel in any way.
And so, a fearful month begins, bedeviled by US electoral paralysis, in which any notions of the outgoing Biden administration being able to rein in Israel seem a little fanciful. The White House is, it seems, being told about huge escalations, like the assassination of Nasrallah last week, as they actually happen. If US Vice President Kamala Harris wins, her White House may decide to switch off the taps and slow Israel’s moves. And even Donald Trump, who seems to want all wars to stop, may have less of an appetite for a lengthy Israeli operation deep inside Lebanon that he ends up partially paying for. But on the hustings neither candidate wants to give the other the chance of labeling them weak on defending Israel.
Netanyahu’s full intentions remain unclear. The closure of towns around Metula in northern Israel and shelling across the border has led to some speculation the IDF might be attempting a lightning race West towards the Lebanese city of Tyre, effectively cutting off all of Hezbollah in the country’s south. While this may be attractive strategically on a map, it is potentially a huge task with a lot of unkind geography in its way.
But this is emblematic of the extraordinary jeopardy Israel now finds itself in. With a maximalist leader who had appeared to have shunned all diplomacy, it must now set a limited scope on an operation that it also hopes can permanently redefine the security threat to its north. It must find a way of inflicting significant damage on an adversary that has never been so weak, but also avoid getting caught in a trap.
The Israeli prime minister has sanctioned actions over the past fortnight that have seemed tactically astute despite an apparent disregard for civilian casualties. But they are an outlier in the scope of the past year. The open sore of Gaza – a conflict without a perceivable end, or idea solution for coexistence and political accommodation for the Palestinians – shows how belligerent the current war cabinet can be when faced with larger strategic decisions. For Israel’s military endeavor to last weeks and not months, they will need extraordinary and rare success, discipline, and political wisdom.
